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Catherine Gallagher
One would expect Mary Poovey's A History of the Modern Fact.-
Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and Society' and
Barbara Shapiro's A Culture of Fact: England, 1550-17202 to cover
roughly similar ground. After all, they both locate the origins of the
1. MARY POOVEY, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN FACT: PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE IN
THE SCIENCES OF WEALTH AND SOCIETY (1998).
2. BARBARA SHAPIRO, A CULTURE OF FACT: ENGLAND, 1550-1720 (2000).
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modern concept of "fact" in early modern England and chronicle its
migration across numerous discourses and disciplines by the eigh-
teenth century. Both, moreover, note the frequently made distinction
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries between "fact," denoting
a free-standing particular, and a cluster of terms designating the
context into which facts might be integrated as evidence: "theory,"
"law," "conjecture," or "hypothesis." And they draw on many of the
same earlier scholars, especially Lorraine Daston, Peter Dear, Simon
Schaffer, and Steven Shapin,3 while both also mount significant refu-
tations of the latter's characterization of the ethos and methods of
the Royal Society. Finally, neither undertakes a new causal explana-
tion of the rise of the fact; while referring to the general context of
exploration and colonization, religious dispute and civil war, they
stay within the confines of discursive history.
But despite these similarities the authors offer us almost totally
unrelated methods and narratives. With little methodological self-
consciousness, Shapiro primarily traces the word "fact" from one
domain to another, noting when it appears, what assumptions it
imports into the discourse, and how its usage changes in the period.
Her analyses are spare, and her evidence is reported with a crisp, no-
nonsense efficiency that lends itself easily to the summaries that
appear at the ends of the chapters. Hers is a history of the fact that
Sergeant Friday himself might have written. In contrast, Poovey is
methodologically garrulous, devoting both an introduction and a first
chapter to the elaboration of her assumptions and procedures, and to
the justification of the discourses and texts she will treat. She pays
little attention to the appearance of the term "fact" as she proceeds,
and she chooses her texts not for their representativeness or even for
the importance of their contributions to the sciences of wealth and
society, but for their own epistemological self-scrutiny.
The two authors' narratives are similarly disconnected from each
other. Shapiro claims that the modern fact first appeared in the Eng-
lish legal distinction between matters of fact, which juries were asked
3. See, e.g., LORRAINE DASTON, CLASSICAL PROBABILITY IN THE AGE OF ENLIGHTEN-
MENT (1988); Lorraine Daston, Marvelous Facts and Miraculous Evidence in Early Modern
Europe, in RETHINKING OBJECTIVITY (Allan Megill ed., 1994); Lorraine Daston, Strange
Facts, Plain Facts, and the Texture of Scientiic Experience in the Enlightenment, in PROOF
AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON AUTHORITY, OBJECTIVITY, AND EVIDENCE (Suzanne L.
Marchand et al. eds., 1996); LORRAINE DASTON & KATHERINE PARK, WONDERS AND THE
ORDER OF NATURE, 1650-1750 (1997); PETER DEAR, DISCIPLINE AND EXPERIENCE: THE
MATHEMATICAL WAY IN THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION (1995); Peter Dear, Miracles, Experi-
ments, and the Ordinary Course of Nature, 81 ISIS 663 (1990); PETER DEAR, REVOLUTION-
IZING THE SCIENCES: EUROPEAN KNOWLEDGE AND ITS AMBITIONS, 1500-1700 (2001);
STEVEN SHAPIN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF TRUTH: CIVILITY AND SCIENCE IN SEVENTEENTH-
CENTURY ENGLAND (1994); STEVEN SHAPIN & SIMON SCHAFFER, LEVIATHAN AND THE
AIR-PUMP: HOBBES, BOYLE, AND THE EXPERIMENTAL LIFE (1985).
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to decide, and matters of law, which judges alone could determine.
Dating back to medieval times and closely bound to the develop-
ment of the jury system, the legal distinction viewed the "facts" of
the case as the particular acts of persons that might be at issue: For
example, did a defendant commit a particular act? When, where, and
how was it done, and what was the evidence that would prove the
fact? Without any knowledge of the law, it was thought, a panel of
respectable and competent men, confronted with sufficient evidence,
could ascertain with reasonable certainty the truth about such
disputed acts. Hence, according to Shapiro, the concept of a parti-
cular datum, floating free of any controlling system of knowledge,
came into being with the rise of juries and then migrated to other
discourses: history, travel reporting, journalism, natural history and
natural philosophy, religion, and the novel. The story Shapiro tells is
one of diffusion from a widely experienced but nevertheless quite
specific legal domain to virtually all other forms of knowledge.
Poovey also begins with a practice: double-entry bookkeeping,
which, she claims, gives the impression that discrete bits of data exist
independently of the accounting record and are merely being objec-
tively ordered on a page. But Poovey does not claim that double-
entry bookkeeping is a source of the fact; for her it is merely an early
instance, and she makes very few references back to it in later
chapters. For Poovey, whose disciplinary focus on the forerunners to
political economy is tighter than Shapiro's but whose chronological
span is longer, the spread of the modern fact is less the narrative of a
concept radiating out from an origin than it is the appearance of suc-
cessive moments of epistemological reconfiguration.
Only in their treatments of the Royal Society's founding do the
two books intersect at all, and even in that episode, they come at the
relevant history from widely different angles. Shapiro devotes almost
a quarter of her book to the appearance of the fact in the natural
sciences, emphasizing the resistance it initially faced from the verum/
factum dichotomy, in which the former referred to God's artifact,
nature, and the latter to the deeds of mankind. Before the seven-
teenth century, "fact" or "factum" was by definition a human act,
and therefore a contingent, particular thing; God's artifacts, or the
"vera" of nature, were, on the other hand, necessary forms and laws.
A natural fact was therefore a contradiction in terms before the
seventeenth century. When the idea of natural facts first appeared, it
involved recording specific human observations of nature and trying
to suspend judgment about their meaning. Hence Bacon often
argued against hypotheses or theory-driven experiments, and the
Royal Society also showed a bias in favor of plain descriptions of
what had been experienced, without conjectures about the observa-
2002]
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tions' meanings. At first, in other words, the natural fact was the
record of a human observation, which, as in the law court, required
witnesses and testimony. Indeed, Shapiro demonstrates that Bacon
(himself a judge), as well as many of his followers in the Royal
Society, not only analogized the methods of natural history to those
of legal demonstration in their rhetoric, but also tried to base their
method on certain courtroom procedures, such as privileging eyewit-
nesses, noting the witnesses' reliability, and maximizing the number
of witnesses.' Shapiro makes an overwhelmingly convincing case that
the natural fact, as a specific observation, was at first an adaptation
of the legal fact. Only later were conclusions drawn from experimen-
tal observation, such as the existence of gravity, said to be facts
themselves. Between Bacon and Newton, the word was slowly trans-
formed, first meaning discrete observations that might be contested
("matters of fact" that observers tried to prove), later implying parti-
culars that had been proved, and finally, with Newton, applying to
general rules induced from particulars.
Poovey also credits Bacon with the seventeenth-century elevation
of particular experiences of the natural world to a new epistemologi-
cal prominence; however, because her main interest is in the
precursors to political economy-bookkeeping, political arithmetic,
experimental moral philosophy, and conjectural history-she de-
votes only a dozen pages to seventeenth-century natural history and
natural philosophy. As she relates it, in the seventeenth century,
facts acquired an ability to prove or disprove generalities that they
never had in the older Aristotelian scheme, in which particulars only
appeared to illustrate already known laws. Bacon, according to
Poovey, promoted particular experiences at the expense of general
theories in order to put all dogmatic assumptions under scrutiny, but
Poovey does not mention Bacon's legal training in the logic of the
fact as a precedent or inspiration for his privileging of experimental
observation in natural history. Instead, she concentrates on the
epistemological significance of the seventeenth-century natural phil-
osophers' use of the fact, claiming that it takes on what she calls its
peculiar paradoxical quality in their discourse: "The modern fact ...
could be represented either as mere data, gathered at random, or as
data gathered in the light of a social or theoretical context that made
them seem worth gathering."'" In other words, although the modern
fact was often asserted to be a free-standing entity, it was also
simultaneously known to be inside a facts/values relation. For
Poovey, the modern fact always contains this doubleness, which she
4. See, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 117-32.
5. POOVEY, supra note 1, at 96.
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relates to the mathematical ambitions of many of its originators. Jux-
taposing Hobbes with Bacon, to stay with her seventeenth-century
examples, she notes that the former favored a deductive natural
philosophy, modeled on mathematical demonstration, whereas the
latter advanced experimentalism, which would produce data that
might be handled quantitatively. Mathematics, therefore, contains in
itself the facts/values conundrum; numerical representation gives the
appearance of objectivity and precision, but it must either proceed
deductively, from premises already given, or inductively, from data
gathered within a given context. Hence, although the inductive
alternative won the day, even its numerical constructions could never
be value-free.
Whereas Shapiro takes law to be the locus classicus of the modern
fact and piles up references from other disciplines to show that they
modeled their practices on the jury trial, Poovey argues that the
early modern promulgators of facts often took mathematics as their
model form of representation. Shapiro cites more direct evidence for
her claim than Poovey does for hers. Because Poovey's concept of
the modern fact is more complex than Shapiro's and because she
participates in a facts/values puzzle of her own (as she admits), by
letting the endpoint in nineteenth-century quantifying social and
economic sciences define what she means by "the modern fact" in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, one at times catches her
squinting to find something resembling mathematics in such dis-
courses as experimental moral philosophy or Scottish conjectural
history. Poovey's texts often use only what she calls "gestural mathe-
matics, " which might be mathematical metaphors but are sometimes
merely instances of additive, comparative, or demonstrative logic.
For example, she quotes the following passage from Hume as an
instance of gestural mathematics: "And as the same idea can only be
vary'd by a variation of its degrees of force and vivacity; it follows
upon the whole, that belief is a lively idea produc'd by a relation to a
present impression, according to the foregoing definition."6 On a few
occasions she even seems to imply that any claim for deductive
certainty is "gestural mathematics."
More interesting than the strained search for mathematical
rhetoric in the texts under discussion are Poovey's analyses of their
epistemological richness. Her book's considerable significance lies in
its sustained attention to the many modes in which writers on wealth
and society confronted the paradoxes of knowledge and the ways in
which those paradoxes helped to deepen and complicate the subjec-
tivity of investigators while shoring up the model of self-governing
6. Id at 200.
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subjects. Sometimes insouciantly, sometimes anxiously, the writers
she treats most fully were aware of the epistemological puzzles em-
bedded in the pursuit of facts, and Poovey carefully examines the
importance of doubt to their accomplishments. Even more strikingly,
she aligns their tolerance of uncertainty, especially in the latter part
of the eighteenth century and early nineteenth century, with the con-
solidation of "liberal governmentality," in which subjects perceive
themselves to be individuals with separate interests in an abstract
system called "society," which is self-regulating and requires their or-
derly pursuit of their own interests. "Governmentality" is Foucault's
term for those modern instruments through which power regulates
unofficially; for example, the creation of such categories as human
nature, society, individual, population, as well as the concept of their
autonomous internal dynamics, are all aspects of governmentality.
As I understand Poovey's argument, the backwardness of the eigh-
teenth-century British state in collecting official social and economic
information only stimulated efforts by private groups and individuals
to come up with social knowledge. Society was therefore not per-
ceived to be the creation of the state, but instead appeared to be
something prior, with its own built-in rules that might be discovered.
Within this context, Poovey presents the awareness of the difficulty
of discerning those rules, especially in the form of grappling with the
facts/values tension, sometimes as a subversive deconstruction of the
project of liberal governmentality (as in her reading of Dr. Johnson's
A Journey to the Western Islands of Scotland), but often as an
intrinsic part of the project itself, which would ultimately result in
sophisticated theoretical developments in probability and abstract
modeling.
Poovey's stress on the unofficial provenance of the modern fact,
her implication that it succeeded because it was problematic and be-
cause it seemed to arise almost spontaneously from the very realm of
the social that it simultaneously created as an object of knowledge,
might help account for the distance between her narrative and
Shapiro's. The fact (as it were) that the law is part of the official state
apparatus may have dissuaded Poovey from examining its seminal
influence. Even while noting the obvious and well-documented
connections between some of the discourses she examines-moral
philosophy or conjectural history, for example-and contemporary
jurisprudential writing, she chooses not to investigate the possible
epistemological ramifications of those connections. Many of the pas-
sages she quotes nevertheless stand as testimony (unremarked in her
analyses) of the wealth of legal rhetoric in those discourses: "The
7. Id at 249-63.
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great Newton first gave an example to philosophers.., by dis-
tinguishing his conjectures from his conclusions, putting the former
by themselves, in the modest form of queries. This is fair and legal
.... .One cannot help wondering what her book might have been
like if law had been treated as a font, a model, or a rhetorical
resource of factual discourse in the sciences of wealth and society. A
closer look at law, for example, might have allowed for a more pre-
cise sense of the supplemental nature of the other discourses. Or, it
might have contributed a somewhat different perspective on the
epistemological issues, the perspective from a discipline relatively
comfortable with the impossibility of absolutely certain knowledge
and tolerant of the necessary fallibility of human judgment. Admit-
ting the importance of law might even have led to an exploration of
how these epistemologically sophisticated thinkers distinguished
knowing from judging. Between the kind of certainty sought in
mathematical demonstration and the kind sought by jurors there is a
wide gap; even on the strength of the evidence provided by Poovey
herself, the architects of the sciences of wealth and society often
seem to have been seeking something closer to the latter than to the
former.
8. Id at 220 (quoting Thomas Reid).
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